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We propose several methods for quantum key distribution (QKD) based on the generation and trans-
mission of random distributions of coherent or squeezed states, and we show that they are secure against
individual eavesdropping attacks. These protocols require that the transmission of the optical line between
Alice and Bob is larger than 50%, but they do not rely on “sub-shot-noise” features such as squeezing.
Their security is a direct consequence of the no-cloning theorem, which limits the signal-to-noise ratio of
possible quantum measurements on the transmission line. Our approach can also be used for evaluating
various QKD protocols using light with Gaussian statistics.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.88.057902 PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Dv, 89.70.+cSince the experimental demonstration of quantum tele-
portation of coherent states [1], a lot of interest has arisen
in continuous variable quantum information processing.
In particular, a stimulating question is whether quantum
continuous variables (QCV) may provide a valid alterna-
tive to the usual “single photon” quantum key distribution
schemes [2]. Most present proposals to use QCV for quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) [3–15] are based upon the use
of “nonclassical” light beams, such as squeezed light, or
pairs of light beams that are correlated for two different
quadrature components (the so-called “EPR” beams, by
analogy with the historical paper by Einstein, Podolsky,
and Rosen [16]). But recent work on this subject [17] un-
derlined the crucial importance of the continuous variable
version of the no-cloning theorem [18], as soon as security
is concerned in any exchange using QCV.
In this Letter, we show that there is actually no need for
squeezed light: An equivalent level of security may be
obtained by simply generating and transmitting random
distributions of coherent states. The security of this novel
protocol is related to the no-cloning theorem, which limits
possible eavesdropping even though the transmitted light
has no “sub-shot-noise” feature such as squeezing. We
show that our analysis can be also applied to other pro-
tocols using light with Gaussian statistics, i.e., squeezed
or EPR beams, thus making the comparison easier. The
basic tools for this analysis are the ones that have been
extensively used for linearized quantum optics, including
in particular optical quantum nondemolition (QND)
measurements [19]. A brief review of the current litera-
ture on continuous variables QKD is presented in [20].
Here we consider security against individual attacks
only, and we do not address the issue of unconditional
security, which was demonstrated in [3] for squeezed
states protocols (unconditional security of coherent states
protocols remains an open question). Our results can
be seen as a generalization of previous single beams
protocols [4–12], based on the Gaussian reconciliation
method proposed in [6,7]. “Single beam” means that the
present approach does not include protocols transmitting
simultaneously several quantum-correlated modes of the0031-90070288(5)057902(4)$20.00electromagnetic field [8,13–15], because their security
analysis should take into account simultaneous attack on
these modes. However, extensions of our methods to
any kind of protocol using Gaussian variables should be
possible.
General principle of the protocols.—The QKD proto-
cols we study here are single Gaussian beam protocols.
Alice modulates randomly a Gaussian beam and sends it
to Bob through a Gaussian noisy channel. Both phase
and amplitude are modulated with Gaussian random num-
bers, since this allows an optimal information rate [21].
Bob then measures either the phase or the amplitude of
this beam and informs Alice which measurement he made.
Bob and Alice have then two correlated sets of Gaussian
variables, from which they can extract a common secret
string of bits as explained below.
The basic tool that we will use is the Shannon formula
giving the optimum information rate I of a noisy transmis-
sion channel, in units of bits/symbol [21]. If the noise is
white and Gaussian and the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is
S, this optimum information rate is
IAB  12 log21 1 S . (1)
Since this optimum can be closely approached only if the
signal has Gaussian statistics [21], we will consider only
Gaussian modulation protocols, and use (1) to calculate
the amount of private information that Alice and Bob may
exchange in the presence of the eavesdropper Eve. The
sliced reconciliation protocol described in detail in [6,7]
and briefly sketched in the Appendix allows us to get ar-
bitrarily close to the value given by (1). For security
purposes, one must assume that Eve has an arbitrarily pow-
erful computer, and thus she is able to reach this limit. In
case Alice and Bob are not, they will have to allow for an
extra security margin (see Discussion below).
After the data exchange and reconciliation, Alice and
Bob share a string of bits which may be partly known by
Eve, and they also know the transmission error rate (pos-
sibly due to Eve) by comparing a subset of the exchanged
data. They can then use standard privacy amplification© 2002 The American Physical Society 057902-1
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be constructed at the rate [23]
DI  IAB 2 IAE , (2)
where IAB IAE is the information rate between Alice and
Bob (Eve).
Eavesdropping.—The IAB term of (2) is easy to compute
for a given scheme, the SNR value SB being known. We
have to assume IAE is being the maximum possible given
the laws of physics (considering here only individual at-
tacks). If the protocols are globally invariant under the
exchange of the two quadratures X and P, the best tactic
for Eve is to keep this property in her attacks. Therefore,
we can restrict ourselves to attacks that treat equally both
quadratures without loss of generality.
Given these hypothesis, we will use a general result,
which is demonstrated in [17] (see also [5,9]): If the added
noise on Bob’s side is xN0, where N0 is the vacuum noise
variance, then the minimum added noise on Eve’s side is
x21N0. This applies to both quadratures, and the added
noise may be due to line losses, eavesdropping, or any
other reason [17]. Since the demonstration of Ref. [17]
is just another form of the no-cloning theorem, it also
addresses any individual attack by Eve using a cloning
machine [18]. When the line has a transmission h with
no Eve present, one has x  1 2 hh. The best attack
for Eve is then to take a fraction 1 2 h of the beam at
Alice’s site, and to send the fraction h to Bob through
her own lossless line (that may be a perfect teleporter).
Eve is then totally undetected, and she gets the maximum
possible information according to the no-cloning theorem.
More generally, Eq. (2) shows that the exchange is secure
as long as Bob has more information on Alice’s key than
Eve, i.e., as long as IAB . IAE . Since the Shannon formula
(1) is valid for both Bob and Eve, the security condition is
just a condition on the SNR, which turns to be a condition
on the added noises:
DI . 0 , SB . SE , x , 1 . (3)
Since x  1 2 hh for a line with transmission h,
the condition x , 1 requires that h . 12. Therefore, a
usable key can be obtained in principle as soon as the trans-
mission losses are less 3 dB. Taking into account the stan-
dard loss of 0.2 dBkm in optical fibers at 1550 nm, the
typical range would be around 10 km.
In this security evaluation, the noise added in Alice’s
side cancels out because it disturbs equally Eve and Bob.
This “canceled” noise includes the quantum noise of the
beam. As a consequence, the security of these protocols re-
lies on the quantum aspects of measuring or copying quan-
tum states, but not on the use of squeezing or entanglement.
We can do quantum cryptography with coherent beams, as
mentioned in [3,8,9], or even with highly noisy beams (in
that case Alice should measure the amplitude of the beam,
split off a small part, and send it to Bob). Quantum fea-
tures of the beams might influence some characteristics of057902-2the protocol such as the secret key rate or the amount of
classical communication needed to agree on the secret key,
but not its security.
Coherent beam protocol.— Let us now explicitly de-
scribe the coherent beam protocols of this family: (i) Alice
draws two random numbers xA and pA from a
Gaussian law with variance VAN0. (ii) She sends to Bob
the coherent state jxA 1 ipA. (iii) Bob randomly chooses
to measure either X or P. This measurement can be done
perfectly. (iv) Using a classical public channel, he informs
Alice about the observable that he measured (as in the
BB84 protocol, half of the key generated by Alice is
unused). (v) Alice and Bob share two correlated Gaussian
variables. Then they may use the “sliced reconciliation”
protocol [6,7] to transform it into errorless bit strings.
Finally, they have to use a standard protocol for privacy
amplification [22] in order to distill the private key.
According to Eq. (1), the channel rate DI for the private
key will be
DI 
1
2 log21 1 SB 2
1
2 log21 1 SE . (4)
The total variance of any quadrature of the beam when
it leaves Alice’s realm is VN0  VAN0 1 N0. Using the
expressions 1 1 SB 
V1x
11x , and 1 1 SE 
V11x
111x , the
useful secret information rate is
DI 
1
2
log2
V 1 x
1 1 Vx
. (5)
If x , 1, DI will increase as a function of the signal
modulation VA. For large modulation xVA ¿ 1, the
asymptotic value of DI is
DIasymp  2
1
2
log2x 
1
2
log2
h
1 2 h
, (6)
while the raw channel rate between Alice and Bob is
IAB 
1
2 log2V1 1 x.
Squeezed state protocol.—This protocol can straightfor-
wardly be generalized to the modulated squeezed beam,
with a squeezing factor s , 1. The protocol becomes
as follows: (i) Alice chooses randomly if the beam is
squeezed in X or P (for instance we will later assume the
beam being X squeezed). Let jc denote this squeezed
state. (ii) Alice draws two random numbers xA and pA
from two Gaussian laws with variances VxAN0 and VpAN0.
The two squeezed directions are indistinguishable for Eve
iff
VxAN0 1 sN0  VpAN0 1
1
s
N0  VN0 . (7)
(iii) Alice sends to Bob the displaced squeezed state
DxA 1 ipAjc. (iv) Bob randomly chooses to measure
either X or P. (v) Using a public channel, Alice and Bob
inform each other about the squeezing direction and the
measured observable. (vi) Such as with coherent states,
Alice and Bob share correlated Gaussian variables, from
which they can extract a private binary key.057902-2
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scribed above if s  1. Another limit, where VpA  0 or
V  1s, is the protocol described by Cerf et al. in [5,6].
In this case, information is gathered for the key only when
Bob makes the right guess.
To compute the private rateDI, we will average between
the right guesses and the wrong guesses:
DI 
1
2
IABX 2 IAEX 1 IABP 2 IAEP , (8)

1
4
log2
1 1 SBX  1 1 SBP
1 1 SEX  1 1 SEP
. (9)
We have SBX  VxAs 1 x 
V2s
s1x and 1 1 SBX 
V1x
s1x . The three other SNR are obtained by replacing x
and/or s by x21 or s21. Therefore,
IAB
1
4
log2
V 1 x2
x
2
1
4
log2
µ
x 1
1
x
1 s1
1
s
∂
,
(10)
IAE 
1
4
log2
V 1 1x2
1x
2
1
4
log2
µ
x 1
1
x
1 s 1
1
s
∂
. (11)
Since the s-dependent term of these information rates are
the same, they cancel each other in DI. The secret infor-
mation rate is thus again given by Eq. (5), and does not
depend on the degree of squeezing.
Extension to EPR case.—The previous description does
not apply directly on EPR protocols. However, an EPR
QKD protocol where Alice keeps one of the beams and
sends the other to Bob is logically equivalent to a randomly
modulated beam with a sub-shot-noise quantum variance.
Let XA denote the quadrature Alice measures and Xout the
same quadrature of the beam sent to Bob when it leaves
Alice’s lab. For a standard nonmodulated EPR scheme
[11], we have the following relations:
X2A  X
2
out  V  s 1 1s2 , (12)
XA 2 Xout2  2s , (13)
XAXout  V 2 s . (14)
We can separate Bob’s beams into two parts, which are, re-
spectively, correlated and uncorrelated with Alice’s mea-
surement, by writing Xout  gXA 1 N , where XAN  
0. Bob’s beam is then equivalent to a beam with quantum
noise N2 on quadrature X, which is randomly modulated
with the variable gXA. Using Eqs. (12) and (14), one gets
g  1 2 sV  1 2 s21 1 s2 , (15)
N2  s2 2 sV   2s1 1 s2 . (16)
These equations describe the case where Alice and Bob
measure the same quadrature. When Alice changes her
quadrature, while Bob keeps the same measurement, the057902-3initial wave packet is reduced onto a noisy quadrature,
and no useful correlation is generated. On the average,
the information rate is therefore half of the “equivalent”
modulation scheme. Using (12), we then have
1 1 SB  1 1
g2V
N2 1 x

V V 1 x
1 1 xV
, (17)
DI 
1
4
log2
µ
V 1 x
1 1 xV
1 1 Vx
V 1 1x
∂

1
2
log2
µ
V 1 x
1 1 xV
∂
. (18)
This value of DI is again just the same as the coherent
state result (5) for given x and V , so that s is defined by
(12). Adding excess noise or a modulation on the outgoing
beam brings no further improvement.
Discussion.—Various comments are in order. First, it
appears that nonclassical features such as squeezing or
EPR correlations have no influence on the achievable se-
cret key rate for the family of protocols that were described
here. This result may not apply to all possible protocols;
e.g., we did not consider using a continuous quantum
memory. On the other hand, since the raw information
rate is different for the same secret key rate, squeezed
beams can be used to save classical communications dur-
ing the privacy amplification procedure. The EPR beams
have also the advantage of directly providing quantum-
generated Gaussian noise, rather than having it externally
generated by Alice. More importantly, entanglement,
which is not directly used in the present protocols, can be
useful to beat the 3 dB limit by using more than one beam.
Though the 3 dB loss limit of our cryptography protocols
makes their security demonstration quite intuitive, there
exist multiple ways for Alice and Bob to go beyond this
limit. The most radical way is to send many EPR beams
through the noisy channel, then to use entanglement
purification [24] to build stored entanglement between
Alice and Bob, and finally to implement a high fidelity
teleporter. For any finite value of the losses and EPR
entanglement, an arbitrarily high fidelity can be achieved
[24]. The no-cloning theorem ensures the security of
these schemes as soon as the fidelity of the teleporter
is above 23 [17], which is equivalent to the 3 dB loss
limit discussed above. In some sense, a “lossless” line is
recreated by using entanglement purification. There may
exist more realistic ways to cross the 3 dB barrier, but
their security analysis is beyond the scope of this Letter.
On the practical side, one should note that Bob’s de-
tectors are not ideal, but have a nonzero electronic noise
B0 that should be much smaller than N0, and a maximum
(saturation) input power sB0 ¿ N0, where s ¿ 1 is the
detector’s dynamics. Taking into account these charac-
teristics in the simplest coherent state protocol gives an
optimum value of the signal variance, VA 	
p
s. An-
other point is that Alice and Bob may not be able to057902-3
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FIG. 1. Private channel information rate DI as a function of
the channel noise x . The three curves in solid lines correspond
to VA  1, 5, and 50 from the bottom to the top, assuming that
the reconciliation protocol between Alice and Bob reaches the
Shannon limit. The three curves in dashed lines correspond to
the effective DI with the same values of VA, with (arbitrarily
chosen) reconciliation efficiencies a that are, respectively, 0.6,
0.8, and 0.95 of the Shannon limit.
achieve the Shannon limit (1), due to limited comput-
ing power (no such limitation is relevant for Eve). As-
suming that the effective information rate between Alice
and Bob is reduced by a factor a , 1, the net secret
rate becomes DIeff  aIAB 2 IAE, and remains positive
if a . IAEIAB. The quantity DIeff is plotted in Fig. 1
for a  1 (solid lines), and for various values of a that
are arbitrarily associated with various values of the SNR
(dashed lines). It is clear that low values of a reduce
the secure transmission range of the protocol. We note
that, according to [6,7], the sliced reconciliation protocol
should yield a 	 1, but this may be costly in terms of
calculation time and public channel transmissions. All
these constraints should eventually be taken into account
to choose the most appropriate value of VA.
In conclusion, it is possible to design a QKD scheme
with coherent states, secure against any individual attack,
by using optimized reconciliation protocols and privacy
amplification. Since the protocol does not require squeez-
ing, it can be implemented by sending light pulses in
a low-loss optical fiber, such as in a coherent optical
telecommunication scheme. In that case, all pulses will
be useful, but half of the information sent by Alice will
be lost. We demonstrated that the protocol is asymptoti-
cally secure [7] for losses smaller than 3 dB (or a telepor-
tation fidelity larger than 23 [17]), and the net information
rate for the private key with a large signal modulation is
12 log21x  12 log2h1 2 h.
This work was carried out in the framework of the Eu-
ropean IST/FET/QIPC project “QuICoV.” We are grateful
to N. J. Cerf and G. Van Assche for helpful discussions.
Appendix: Sliced reconciliation protocol.— In the n-
slice version of the reconciliation protocol proposed in
Ref. [7], the real axis representing the amplitude of the057902-4signal is split in 2n intervals s1  2 `,2t1, s2  2
t1,2t2, . . . , s2n t2n21,1`, where tp  2t2n2p , and
t2n21  0. Alice assigns an amount of n bits to an am-
plitude that lies in the interval sp, by using the parity of p
for bit 1, the parity of the integer part of p2 for bit 2, and
of p2n21 for bit n. After receiving the data, Bob makes
an optimized guess of the first bit value using appropriate
weighting functions, which are computed by optimizing
the choice of the 
tp (this optimization is made only once,
before exchanging the data). After a first correction round
by exchanging public data between Alice and Bob, Bob
knows the correct value of the first bit. Then he tries to
guess the second bit, with a much higher probability of
success, because he already knows the first one. By in-
creasing both the SNR S and the number of slices, the
process gets more and more efficient, keeping the same
main idea: After each correction round, Bob can guess
the next bit with a higher probability. For the five-slice
protocol with S  15 presented in [7], the probabilities
of guessing right for slices four and five are, respectively,
0.976 and 0.999 994, and the efficiency is more than 90%
of the Shannon limit 12 log216  2.
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